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Brown v. Luebbers
344 F.3d 770 (8th Cir. 2003)
L Fats
In 1991, a Missouri jury found Vernon Brown ("Brown") guilty of first
degree murder for strangling Synetta Ford to death in her basement apartment
In the sentencing phase of the trial Brown sought to introduce as mitigation a
letter from his brother, Darius Turner ("Turner"), a member of the United States
Armythen serving in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Shield.2 In the letter
Turner recounted how, as a child, Brown had been a zealous guardian of his little
brother and his little brother's friends and claimed that he still cared for Brown
a great deal, perhaps more than he cared for any other of his family members.'
The trial judge found the letter to be inadmissible hearsay and declined to admit
it into evidence.' Subsequently, the jury sentenced Brown to death.'
Pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15(a), Brown moved for post-
conviction relief in the trial court.6 The trial court denied the motion The
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions in a consolidated
appeal.' Thereafter, Brown sought habeas relief in federal district court.9 The
district court declined to grant relief on any of the thirty-one grounds Brown
presented but issued a certificate of appealability ("COA") on eleven of those
1. State v. Brown, 998 S.W2d 531,537 (Mo. 1991).
2. Id at 549.
3. Brown v. Luebbers, 344 F.3d 770,784-85 (8th ar. 2003).
4. Id at 785.
5. Id at 773.
6. Id After conviction of a felony in a Missouri state court, if the convicted person clairs
the sentence was contrary to Mdissouri or federal law, was in excess of the maximum sentence
authorized by such laws, was imposed outside the sentencing court's jurisdiction, or was imposed
on that person after a trial in which she did not have the benefit of effective assistance of counsel,
that person "may seek relief in the sentencing court pursuant to the provisions of this Rule 29.15."
Mo. SUP. Cr. R- 29.15(a).
7. Brt, 344 F.3d at 773.
8. Bmru; 998 S.W2d at 537.
9. Bmur4 344 F.3d at 773.
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grounds.' ° Brown appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit."
I. Hddig
Because the Supreme Court of Missouri failed to rule on Brown's claim that
the trial judge's refusal to admit his brother's letter into evidence violated his
constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Eighth
Circuit considered the constitutional question on its merits. 2 The Eighth Crcuit
found that the trial court violated Brown's constitutional rights byexcluding the
letter.3 The court also concluded that the error was not harmless. 4 Therefore,
the Eighth Circuit overturned the district court and granted Brown's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.'"
IM. A )s U.
The Eighth Circuit declined to applythe stringent standard of review found
in 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) to Brown's habeas claim. 6 Byits own terms, S 2254 only
applies to claims "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.""'
Although Brown argued that the trial judge's refusal to admit the letter violated
his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court of
Missouri considered the claim onlyin light of state evidentiarylaw and noted that
the" 'exclusion does not in the context of this case seem prejudicial'""s Because
there was no state decision within the meaning of S 2254 to which that section's
10. Id; sw 28 U.S.C S 2253(c)(1) (2000) (allowing a district judge to issue a OA on a
petitioner's habeas claim after denying that claim; part of AEDPA); 4THQKR. 22(a)(2) (stating that
a district judge mayissue a COA after denying a petitioner habeas relief. For a complete discussion
of the new 4THC QER. 22(a), seendny Maxwell C Smith, Rule Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 635 (2004)
(analyzing 4TH QR. R. 22(a)).
11. Bmnia, 344 F.3d at 773. This case note will onlyaddress Brown's claim that his brother's
letter should have been admitted into evidence. The court denied relief on the remainder of
Brown's claims. Id at 784.
12. Id at 784-86.
13. Id at 786.
14. Id
15. Id at 787.
16. Id at 785; s&28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) (2000) (limiting a federal judge's abilityto grant habeas
relief to instances in which the petitioner shows that a state court decision on the merits of the claim
"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined bythe Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in
a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding"; part of AEDPA).
17. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d); Bnzm, 344 F.3d at 785.
18. Bm&&, 344 F.3d at 785 (quoting Bomw 998 S.W.2d at 550).
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standards could be applied, the Eighth Circuit heard Brown's constitutional
argument on its merits. 9
The Eighth Circuit held that the trial court's exclusion of Turner's letter
violated both the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.20 The Eighth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court held in
Lodkeu v Obial2
"[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer,
in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from consid-
ering, as a .r i.g faao, any aspect of a defendant's character or
recoid and anyof e circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. "22
Additionally, the Court previously held in Grnv Qo*' that the exclusion of
substantially reliable evidence," 'highly relevant to a critical issue in the punish-
ment phase of the trial,' " violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.24 Finally, failure to admit mitigating evidence in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments is reversible error unless the error was
hamless.25
The Eighth Circuit noted that the authenticity of the letter was not in
doubt.26 Therefore, the exclusion of the letter violated due process "if it was
highly relevant to a critical issue."" The Eighth Circuit found that the letter was
relevant because it referred to Brown favorably and showed Turner's affection
for him.28 The court concluded that exclusion of the letter violated both due
process and the Eighth Amendment.29 The court found that this error consti-
tuted grounds for habeas relief because it was not harmless." The Eighth Circuit
19. Id
20. Id at 786.
21. 438 US. 586 (1978).
22. Bmzzn, 344 F.3d at 785 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality
opinion)); Loek, 438 U.S. at 604; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (adopting the rule of Lockdr).
23. 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
24. Bm=4, 344 F.3d at 785 (quoting Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam));
se U.S. COT. amend. XIV, S 1 (stating that no state shall "deprive anyperson of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law").
25. Bmwn 344 F.3d at 786 (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 399 (1987)).
26. Idat 785.
27. Id at 785-86.
28. Id at 786.
29. Id The court did not explain whyit found that the Eighth Amendment was violated, but
apparently the rule from Lkt encompassed this case as it constituted a capital case in which a
sentencer was precluded from considering a mitigating factor. Id at 785-86.
30. Id at 786.
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reasoned that because Brown's character was the pivotal issue at this phase of the
trial and the letter sought to directly contradict the State's claim that Brown's life
was not worth saving by illustrating his importance to his brother, exclusion of
the letter was not harmless.3 Moreover, the court found that the letter was all
the more compelling because Turner was a member of the armed forces, the trial
was held during Operation Desert Shield, and the trial judge frequently lauded
the service of the armed forces in that engagement in the presence of the jury.
Therefore, the court granted Brown a writ of habeas corpus.33
IV. Applicatin mVi*zia
In Virginia, the admissibility of Turner's letter would have been governed
by section 19.2-264.4(B) of the Virginia Code. That section reads, in pertinent
part:
In cases of trial by jury, evidence may be presented as to any matter
which the court deems relevant to sentence, except that reports under
the provisions ofS 19.2-299, or under any rule of court, shall not be
admitted into evidence.
Evidence which maybe admissible, subject to the rules of evidence
governing admissibility, may include the circumstances surrounding
ie offense, the history and background of the defendant, and any
other facts in mitigation of the offense.34
Although the wording of the second sentence of the statute implies that only
relevant mitigating evidence must satisfy the rules of evidence, the Supreme
Court of Virginia has recentlyheld that it applies to both mitigating and aggravat-
ing evidence.3 Under Virginia law, Turner's letter would have been hearsayand
31. Bmn, 344 F.3d at 786. Judge Bowman vigorously dissented on this point. Id at 787-89
(Bowman, J., dissenting). He believed that the aggravating evidence was so powerful that exclusion
of the mitigating evidence was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 788. (Bowman, J.,
dissenting).
32. Id at 786. The judge said, "I suppose that there is only one type of service that a citizen
can render to his government or to society above jury duty is that which is now being enacted in
the Gulf area, war, that's the highest dutythat a citizen owes to his count y." Id He also stated that
"[s]erving your country in times of conflict and things of that nature is the onlyservice a citizen can
perform that is greater than serving on jury duty," and "I know we will all keep our troops in the
Persian Gulf in mind when we say our prayers." Id
33. Id
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Mdichie Supp. 2003).
35. Id; see Jackson v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 520, 526 (Va. 2004) (finding that S 19.2-
264.4(B) does not allow otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence to be admitted during the
sentencing phase of trial; Powellv. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 537,555-56 (Va. 2004) ("Powell's
assertion that Code 5 19.2-264.4(B) permits the introduction of hearsay evidence not otherwise
subject to anexceptionis simplywrong."); Lovittv. Warden, 585 S.E.2d 801,826 (Va. 2003) (noting
that affidavits by the petitioner's family members would not be admissible in the sentencing phase
of the trial because, "[u]nlike some other jurisdictions, Virginia does not permit the admission of
[Vol. 16:2
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excluded.36 This result is at odds with the United States Supreme Court prece-
dent discussed in Brounv L UNhen.37 The Supreme Court has repeatedlyaffirmed
its decision in Lodeett and stated that under the Eighth Amendment, as applied
to the states, in a capital case a sentencer must be allowed to consider all mitigat-
ing factors including aspects "of a defendant's character or record and anyof the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death."3" Therefore, under Supreme Court precedent, section 19.2-
264.4(B) is unconstitutional to the extent it precludes a capital sentencer from
considering such relevant evidence in mitigation.
Additionally, section 19.2-264.4(B), as recently construed by the Supreme
Court of Virginia, could violate a defendant's due process rights as defined bythe
Supreme Court in G?&r Because the rule announced in Gntn is not nearly as
broad as the one in Lodeet, state courts have applied it, in varying degrees of
severity, to admit normally inadmissible evidence during the sentencing phase if
the evidence is relevant and reliable.39 In &w; the Court noted that " 'the
hearsay rule may not be applied mechanisticallyto defeat the ends of justice.' 40
such hearsayevidence during penaltyphase proceedings"); Maxwell C. Smith, Case Note, 16 CAP.
DEF. J. 533 (2004) (analyzing Gerry) Jackson v. Commonwealth,590 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 2004));
Terrence T. Egland, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 591 (2004) (analyzing Powell v. Commonwealth,
590 S.E.2d 537 (Va. 2004)); Meghan H Morgan, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 573 (2004) (analyzing
Lovitt v. Warden, 585 S.E2d 801(Va. 2003)). Please contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearing-
house at (540) 458-8557 fora motion to bar the introduction of hearsayaggravating evidence during
the sentencing phase of a capital trial and a motion to declare section 19.2-264.4(B) of the Virginia
Code unconstitutional as applied to mitigating elements.
36. Se Taylor v. Commonwealth, 502 S.E.2d 113, 117 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) ("Hearsay is an
out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Q-ARES E. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENC IN VIRGINIA S 18-1 (6th ed. 2003)
(defining hearsay in Virginia as a statement not made by a testifying declarant during trial offered
in an attempt to prove the matter asserted in the statement); s'alsoLoa, 585 S.E2d at 826 (finding
that affidavits from defendant's family members to be used as mitigation would have been
inadmissible hearsay at triaD.
37. Brout 344 F.3d at 785-86.
38. SeeLodent, 438 U.S. at 604 (stating that under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,
a sentencer in most capital cases must "not be precluded from considering, a a nigzaaor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death"); Eddby, 455 U.S. at 110 (applying the
rule from Lodeekt); see also McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 438 (1990) (affirming that a
capital sentencer may not be precluded from considering mitigating evidence); Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367, 374 (1988) (same).
39. Sw eg, People v. Weaver, 29 P.3d 103, 166 (Cal. 2001) (declining to adopt a broad
reading of Gran and allowing the introduction of mitigating evidence which would otherwise violate
state evidentiary rules only when the excluded evidence was both "highly relevant and reliable");
Drane v. State, 455 S.E2d 27, 30-31 (Ga. 1995) (allowing evidence which is both reliable and
relevant to be admitted in sentencing phase even if normally the evidence would be inadmissible
under state evidentiary rules).
40. Gram, 442 U.S. at 97 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
2004]
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Section 19.2-264.4(B) has no exception for highly relevant and reliable
mitigating evidence during a capital sentencing phase. The Supreme Court of
Virginia has previously upheld a trial court's decision to bar hearsay mitigating
evidence in the sentencing phase of trial." On review, the Fourth Circuit deter-
mined that the Supreme Court of Virginia had not violated Gnm in finding that
the evidence in that case could be excluded as hearsay during the sentencing
phase. 2 More recently, in L out u Wank, 43 the Virginia high court cited section
19.2-264.4(B) for the proposition that affidavits bya petitioner's familymembers
would not be admissible in the sentencing phase of the trial because, "[uInlike
some other jurisdictions, Virginia does not permit the admission of such hearsay
evidence during penaltyphase proceedings." 44 If the court meant that all mitigat-
ing hearsayevidence is inadmissible during the sentencing phase of trial, then the
rule in Virginia would clearly run afoul of the Supreme Court's prohibition
against the mechanistic application of state hearsay rules to exclude relevant and
reliable evidence in mitigation. Relying on Lodut the court stated that "in
Virginia, hearsayevidence also is not admissible during a penaltyphase proceed-
ing."4 Therefore, to the extent that it would bar relevant and reliable mitigating
evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, section 19.2-264.4(B) is
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause, as delineated by the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Gum,
V. Cmcswin
This case illustrates the reasons why section 19.2-264.4(B) is unconstitu-
tional. The cases relied on by the Eighth Circuit to overrule the trial court's
exclusion of Turner's letter would apply with equal force to overruling the
exclusion of evidence pursuant to section 19.2-264.4(B). Under Gmn and
L odee, section 19.2-264.4(B) is unconstitutional to the extent it bars relevant and
reliable mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial.
Maxwell C Smith
41. SeeBuchanan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 757, 773 (Va. 1989) (upholding the trial
court's decision to exclude the defendant's expert witnesses' reports of interviews with others under
the hearsay rule).
42. Buchanan v. Angelone, 103 F.3d 344, 348-49 (4th ar. 1996) (finding that none of the
special considerations in Gnm were present in the petitioner's case).
43. 585 S.E.2d 801 (Va. 2003).
44. Lo*, 585 S.E.2d at 826.
45. jadeson, 590 S.E.2d at 526 (citing Loti 585 S.E.2d at 826); sw Poud, 590 S.E.2d at
555-56 (stating that section 19.2-264.4(B) excludes hearsayevidence from the sentencing phase of
a capital case).
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